AI Research NVDANVDA_earnings

NVDA earnings-day reaction vs EPS surprise magnitude (last ~3 years)

A clear chunk of NVDA’s earnings beats still closed the day down: 36.4% of beats and 37.5% of “clear beats” (≥5pp) lost ground, and many showed a gap-up that faded intraday. Quantitatively, surprise explains almost nothing of same-day variance (Pearson r = 0.184, R² = 0.034) and the fitted slope implies only about +0.32% per 10 percentage-point surprise — a very small mechanical effect. Beats averaged +1.79% versus the lone miss at −0.40%, but that difference is not statistically robust (Welch p = 1.00).

This study looks at 12 NVDA earnings releases over the last ~3 years, measuring day-0 returns (close-to-close), gap and intraday moves, and correlating those with EPS surprise magnitude. The working thesis — that guidance and crowded pre-print positioning often trump the headline EPS — guides the interpretation; the full statistics, charts, and event-by-event detail follow below.

The research question

For NVDA over the past ~3 years, does the size of each quarter's EPS surprise actually drive the earnings-day price reaction, or has 'buy the rumor, sell the news' broken that link — how often does a clear beat still close red? Thesis: the relationship between surprise magnitude and the earnings-day move is weak and several beats sold off, because guidance and crowded pre-print positioning drive the reaction far more than the headline number.

How this was measured

Filtered NVDA quarterly earnings to the last ~3 years with non-null surprise_percentage. For each release, defined day 0 as the first trading day on-or-after the reported_date. Computed earnings-day reaction as close(t0)/close(t-1)−1 (day-0 return), plus gap (open(t0)/close(t-1)−1) and intraday (close(t0)/open(t0)−1). Measured the relationship between surprise magnitude (percentage points) and day-0 return via Pearson/Spearman and an OLS slope (return per 1pp of surprise). Counted how often beats — and 'clear beats' (surprise ≥ +5pp) — still closed red. Also compared beat vs miss day-0 returns using Welch’s t-test (unequal variance).

The key numbers

Earnings events analyzed
12
day-0 window: 2023-08-23 to 2026-05-20
Pearson r (surprise vs day-0 return)
0.184
N=12
Spearman ρ (rank)
0.357
Rank-based; robust to outliers
OLS slope (per 1pp surprise)
0.0320%
Return change per 1 percentage-point surprise
R² (linear fit)
0.034
Mean day-0 return — beats
1.7950%
N=11
Mean day-0 return — misses
-0.3972%
N=1
Welch p-value (beats vs misses)
1.0000
p=1.0000 ≥ 0.05 → no clear mean difference
Beats closing red (share)
36.3636%
N=11 beats
Clear beats (≥5pp) closing red (share)
37.5000%
N=8 clear beats
Gap-up then fade on beats (share)
36.3636%
gap>0 and intraday<0 among beats

Reading the numbers

Across 12 NVDA earnings (Aug 2023–May 2026) the link between EPS surprise and same-day return is weak (Pearson r=0.184, R²≈0.034). Notably, about 36.4% of beats still closed the day red, so surprises rarely tell the whole story.

The charts

NVDA earnings surprise (%) vs earnings-day (day-0) return
What this chart says

This scatter places each quarter's EPS surprise on the x-axis (range −100.0 to 30.4348 percentage points, mean 1.2925) against the day-0 return on the y-axis (range −0.0842 to 0.0964, mean 0.0161). The points form a loose cloud rather than a tight upward trend, and the reported Pearson r=0.184 with R²≈0.034 shows surprise size explains only about 3.4% of the return variation. The OLS slope (0.0003201 per 1pp surprise) is essentially negligible, so even big positive surprises do not reliably produce big positive same-day moves.

Day-0 return distribution by surprise direction
What this chart says

The box plot compares the single miss (n=1, mean −0.004) to the 11 beats (mean 0.0179) and shows beats have a higher central tendency but a wide spread (beats min −0.0842, max 0.0964). Importantly, some beats closed negative, so the distribution overlaps materially with the miss. The Welch p-value = 1.0 means the apparent mean advantage for beats is not statistically clear in this sample.

Share of beats that closed red
What this chart says

These bars show that 36.36% of all beats closed the day red and 37.5% of "clear" beats (≥5pp) also finished down. Put simply, more than one-third of beats — including sizable surprises — still lost ground by the close, which aligns with the observed gap-up-then-fade behavior and supports the idea that guidance and pre-print positioning often dominate the headline surprise.

Event-level summary (last ~3 years; up to 20 rows)

reported_dateday0_datesurprise_pctday0_returngap_returnintraday_returndirectionclosed_red
2023-08-232023-08-2330.430.09640.00980.0857beatfalse
2023-11-212023-11-2119.64-0.02940.0006-0.0299beattrue
2024-02-212024-02-2111.930.08060.00550.0747beatfalse
2024-05-222024-05-229.480.05620.00030.0559beatfalse
2024-08-282024-08-287.94-0.08420.0038-0.0876beattrue
2024-11-202024-11-208-0.03690-0.0369beattrue
2025-02-262025-02-264.710.00640.007-0.0006beatfalse
2025-05-282025-05-2880.04290.00160.0412beatfalse
2025-08-272025-08-273.96-0.035-0.0003-0.0347beattrue
2025-11-192025-11-194.840.08450.00440.0798beatfalse
2026-02-252026-02-256.580.01570.00340.0123beatfalse
2026-05-202026-05-20-100-0.0040.0079-0.0118misstrue

The takeaway

Short answer: No — over the last ~3 years NVDA's same-day close is only weakly tied to EPS surprise, and a meaningful share of beats still finished the day red. The numbers show a very small linear link (Pearson r = 0.184, Spearman ρ = 0.357) with R² = 0.034, so surprise explains only about 3.4% of day-0 return variance. The OLS slope is ~0.000320 return per 1 percentage-point surprise (about +0.32% per 10pp), meaning even large surprises imply modest expected moves. Beats averaged about +1.79% (N=11) versus the single miss at about −0.40% (N=1), but the Welch test gave p = 1.00 — no statistically significant difference. In practice 36.4% of beats closed red and 37.5% of “clear beats” (≥5pp) did too, and 36.4% of beats showed a gap-up that faded intraday, so selling into beats is common. Bottom line: the evidence leans toward surprise being a weak predictor — useful as one input, but far from a reliable trigger for same-day direction.

The fine print